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Abstract 
This paper uses different sources of data to assess the relative level of openness of the public 
procurement markets of major trading nations, with a specific focus on the European Union (EU). The 
data reveal a picture that is very different from what is commonly argued to be the case by 
policymakers in the EU. The divergence between discourse and reality is in part a reflection of the 
absence of appropriate data on government sourcing patterns, suggesting greater effort is needed to 
both compile more accurate statistics and to take into account basic economic factors such as the size 
of economies. 
Keywords 
Government procurement, home bias, openness, trade negotiations. 
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Introduction* 
In recent years there has been a “beauty contest” as to which country is the “most” open in terms of 
public procurement. This debate has been going on in the WTO forum, but has been even fiercer in the 
negotiation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). In particular, some European Union Member 
States (EUMS) and the Commission have claimed that the EU public procurement markets are more 
open than those of its main large trading partners. More importantly for the future of the world trade 
regime, countries that believe they are the most open often hold the view that they are entitled to 
“reciprocity”—meaning that they have a “right” to get increased access to foreign public procurement 
markets without providing new concessions. In March 2012, for example, the EU Commission tabled 
a proposal for a regulation on “the access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s internal 
market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and 
services to the public procurement markets of third countries” (COM/2012/124/FINAL). The 
discussions on this Regulation often called for a so-called “reciprocity” clause which would open the 
legal possibility for the EU to deny access to its public procurement markets to firms originating from 
countries with public procurement markets that the EU regards as less open than its own markets.
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A basic goal of this paper is to provide some robust evidence on the relative level of openness of 
public procurement markets of the major trading nations of the world. As the data suggest conclusions 
that are very different from the EU claims, an effort is made to understand the reasons for such a 
divergence between discourse and reality, and some lessons are drawn for trade policy initiatives and 
negotiations on public procurement matters. 
1. How open are the EU public procurement markets? A brief review 
The study that triggered the claims that the EU was more open than major trading partners was a 
background report commissioned by the European Commission in preparation for its 2012 proposal 
for a Regulation on public procurement (Ramboll Consulting Management and HTW Chur, 2012, 
hereafter the Ramboll study). This study was followed by an impact assessment working document 
(IAWD) which served as the analytical basis of the Directive proposal and which reinforced the 
Ramboll study’s conclusion [European Commission 2012]. For the sake of simplicity, the IAWD is 
examined in detail in Annex 1.  
The Ramboll study tries to provide evidence on the relative openness of the EU public procurement 
markets compared to those of four large countries (Canada, China, Japan and the US). It relies on two 
key variables drawn from the National Accounts: (i) total demand of goods and services, defined as 
the sum of intermediate consumption plus final consumption expenditures, gross capital formation and 
exports for every sector; and (ii) imports of goods and services for every sector. Each of these two 
variables is split into a private and a public component. For instance, public sector demand (hereafter 
public demand) for goods and services is defined as the final consumption expenditure by 
governments plus the intermediate consumption by the sectors carrying out procurement procedures 
                                                     
*
 This paper revisits, expands and updates Messerlin and Miroudot (2012). I thank very much Sebastien Miroudot for 
continuous discussions on this topic and am grateful to Bernard Hoekman for very helpful comments. All remaining 
errors are my own. 
1
 According to the Commission work programme for 2015, the proposal will be amended in line with the priorities of the 
current Commission. See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/international/index_en.htm 
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(for details, see Ramboll pp. 17-18).
2
 Public sector imports of goods and services are defined 
accordingly. 
The key data reported in the Ramboll study are summarized in its Table 6 which provides the 
shares of total—extra-EU plus intra-EU—public imports in public demand for goods and services for 
the 21 EUMS for which there are data (Britain is the only large missing EUMS) and the aggregate 
EU21 in 2005. These shares are reproduced in Table 1 under the heading of “ratio 1”.3 They suggest 
that the EU is more open than the four other countries. However, comparing EU ratio 1 with the ratio 
1 of the four other countries—as the Ramboll study does—strongly over-estimate the relative 
openness of the EU public procurement markets simply because ratio 1 includes intra-EU imports. 
These should be considered as “domestic” trade. In analyses of trade in goods, the routine procedure is 
to compare the shares of extra-EU imports alone to GDP with the shares of imports to GDP for the EU 
partners. 
  
                                                     
2
 These industries are (i) electricity, gas and hot water supply, (ii) collection and purification of water, (iii) land transport 
and transport via pipelines, (iv) post and telecoms, (v) public administration and defense, compulsory social security, (vi) 
education, (vii) health and social work, and (viii) sewage, sanitation and similar activities. 
3
 There was no available data for six EUMS: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta and Britain. 
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Table 1. Penetration ratios of public procurement markets, selected countries 
Source: Ramboll [2012]. Notes: Public imports mean public sector imports. [a] the source is Ramboll Table 6, 
page 24. The figures for Canada, China, Japan and the US are reported in this column because they were 
(wrongly) judged by the Ramboll study comparable with the ratio 1for the EU. [b] shares of public intra-EU 
imports assuming that these shares are the same than the shares of public and private intra-EU imports (see text 
above) based on data drawn from Table 6 (EUMS not followed by a star) and from Table 8 (EUMS followed by 
a star) of the Ramboll study. [c] Ratio 3 are derived from ratios 1 and 2 and constitute the “penetration” ratios 
comparable to those for the four non-EU countries. The figures for Canada, China, Japan and the US are reported 
in this column because they are comparable with the ratios 3 for the EU. [d] Ratio 2b are the ratio of intra-EU 
public imports to EU total imports that are required for the EUMS and the EU21 to be as open as Japan’s public 
procurement markets (4.7 percent). [e] Unweighted average for the 21 EUMS with available data. [f] GDP-
weighted average for the 21 EUMS with available data. 
The correct comparison should thus have relied only on the shares of extra-EU public imports in EU 
public demand of goods and services. However, at the time the Ramboll study was undertaken, this 
was problematic as there was no systematic specific data on intra-EU and on extra-EU public imports. 
However, two alternative methods would have provided an imperfect, but acceptable solution to the 
data problem, and would have suggested a very different conclusion in terms of the relative openness 
of the EU public procurement markets compared to the others. 
The first alternative method assumes that the shares of public intra-EU imports in public total 
(intra- and extra-EU) imports are the same as the shares of public and private intra-EU imports in total 
public and private (intra- and extra-EU) imports. Ratio 2 in Table 1 presents these estimated shares of 
public intra-EU imports (based on the shares reported in Tables 6 and 8 of the Ramboll study). Ratio 
3, which is defined as ratio 1*(1-(ratio2/100)) provides a measure of EU “penetration ratios” (the 
Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 3 Ratio 2b Ratio 4
Total public Estimated public Extra-EU public Ratio 2 required Intra-EU public
imports to intra-EU imports imports to for EUMS to be imports to
public demand to total imports public demand as open as Japan public demand
% [a] % [b] % [c] [d] % [c]
Austria 9.6 74.1 2.5 51.4 7.1
Belgium 7.0 74.2 1.8 33.1 5.2
Czech Rep.* 13.9 81.4 2.6 66.2 11.3
Denmark 5.6 65.1 2.0 16.3 3.6
Estonia* 12.5 76.3 3.0 62.6 9.5
Finland 7.0 61.2 2.7 32.8 4.3
France 5.8 61.0 2.3 19.6 3.6
Germany 6.5 58.3 2.7 28.3 3.8
Greece* 7.1 58.2 3.0 34.2 4.1
Hungary 12.6 68.4 4.0 62.8 8.6
Ireland* 9.3 66.7 3.1 49.9 6.2
Italy* 6.0 59.4 2.4 21.8 3.6
Lithuania 12.3 59.3 5.0 62.0 7.3
Netherlands* 6.8 49.4 3.4 31.0 3.3
Poland 6.1 65.3 2.1 23.1 4.0
Portugal* 8.5 76.6 2.0 44.8 6.5
Romania* 18.1 63.0 6.7 74.1 11.4
Slovak Rep.* 16.3 77.8 3.6 71.3 12.7
Slovenia* 11.1 79.4 2.3 57.9 8.8
Spain 8.3 62.8 3.1 43.8 5.2
Sweden* 5.7 70.4 1.7 17.4 4.0
EU21 [e] 9.3 67.1 3.1 49.9 6.3
EU21 [f] 7.0 61.8 2.7 33.4 4.3
Canada 6.9 -- 6.9 -- --
China 6.1 -- 6.1 -- --
Japan 4.7 -- 4.7 -- --
USA 4.6 -- 4.6 -- --
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shares of extra-EU public imports in total demand for public goods and services for each EUMS and 
for the EU21 as a whole). This is the only indicator that is truly comparable to the penetration ratios of 
the four non-EU countries. In sharp contrast with ratio 1, ratio 3 indicates clearly that the EU public 
procurement markets are not more open than those of the four non-EU comparator countries. 
The second alternative method is to calculate “ratio 2b” which is defined as the share of intra-EU 
public imports in EU total imports that would make EU public procurement markets “as open as” 
those of a non-EU country taken as a reference. In Table 1, Japan is used as the reference country 
because, at the time of the Ramboll study, public procurement issues were at the core of the 
preliminary discussions on a Japan-EU preferential trade agreement. Using this measure, for instance, 
France’s penetration ratio would be equivalent to Japan’s penetration ratio if the share of French intra-
EU imports in France’s total imports would be only 19.6 percent—instead of 61 percent. Such a huge 
difference is highly unlikely. 
The data in Table 1 suggest three additional observations. First, Figure 1 plots the (logarithmic) 
correlation between EUMS ratio 1 and their GDP. This correlation is much higher for small countries, 
which makes sense as it seems reasonable that a small country will less easily satisfy its needs for 
goods and services for public procurement purposes by purchasing domestic goods and services than a 
large country which has a wider, more diverse domestic production base. Second, Figure 2 shows that 
the slope of the correlation using ratio 3 (based on only extra-EU public imports) is somewhat flatter 
than in Figure 1. This observation seems consistent with the following proposition: for some kinds of 
public procurement supplies are systematically less easily available in the EUMS economies, hence 
there is a need to have recourse to firms originating in the rest of world—whether the EUMS in 
question is small or large. This phenomenon explains, as least partly, the fact that the GDP-weighted 
average ratios for the EU are smaller than the unweighted average ratios (see Table 1). 
Figure 1. GDP and ratio 1 (share of total public imports in public demand) 
 
Sources: Table 1 and World Bank GDP data. Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2. GDP and ratio 3 (share of extra-EU public imports in public demand) 
 
Sources. Table 1 and World Bank GDP data. Authors’ calculations. 
Lastly, ratio 4 reported in Table 1 (the difference between ratios 1 and 3) can be interpreted as the 
“penetration ratios” within the EU Internal Market. These ratios are often higher than ratio 3 for the 
non-EU countries, but not invariably. This last observation suggests that there is still a substantial way 
to go as far as the functioning of the EU Internal Market in terms of public procurement—a point re-
examined below. 
2. Openness of procurement markets: More evidence on key countries 
The above findings—that EU public procurement markets are less open than those of its main trading 
partners—differs so much from the views expressed by the EU, and in particular by a few EU Member 
States (France and Germany), that it deserves to be backed up by more evidence in order to ensure this 
is a robust result. 
The recent World Input-Output Database [Timmer et al., 2012 and 2015, hereafter WIOD] is one 
source of information that can be used to undertake such a robustness test. It has three key advantages: 
(i) it covers goods and services; (ii) it provides country-specific data for the 14 largest economies in 
the world (with the EU counted as one), as well as for the individual EU Member States; and (iii) it 
does so on an annual basis starting from 1995 through 2011.
4
  
Table 2 provides the “penetration” ratios (that is, ratio 3 in Table 1) for the 13 individual EU 
trading partners based on WIOD data. It also gives those ratios for the EU27 as a whole as well as for 
the EU2, a subset of two EU Member States (France and Germany) for reasons explained later. Table 
2 deserves a preliminary observation related to the Great Crisis (since 2008). All the countries show a 
marked decline in penetration ratios in 2009-2010. The fall is quite large in many cases (more than 10 
percent) except for two countries, Australia and India. These declines are followed by a bounce of 
variable magnitude, depending on the countries. There is little doubt that this evolution is, at least 
partly, related to the structure of the stimulus packages implemented after the 2008-2009 peak Crisis 
years. These packages are likely to have had a “domestic bias” for different reasons. In particular, they 
may have focused on public demand in the sectors having relatively low foreign penetration (a 
                                                     
4
 The main difference between the WIOD data and the data used in the Ramboll study is that WIOD provides a balanced 
set of world input-output tables where national accounts have been fully harmonized across countries. The data are 
different but more comparable across economies. There are minor differences in the industry classification that do not 
allow us to replicate exactly the calculations of the Ramboll study but it does not put at risk our robustness test. 
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composition bias not necessarily driven by protectionist goals) or they may have used procedures 
discriminating against foreign competitors (a clear protectionist bias). 
Table 2. Public procurement markets: import penetration (WIOD data) 
 
Source: World Output-Input Database, November 2013. Authors’ calculations. 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations make it particularly 
interesting to focus on the EU27 and US penetration ratios. As illustrated by Figure 3, these ratios 
were relatively similar from 1995 to 2009, but since then the EU27 ratios are higher than for the US. It 
is worth noting that the growth rate of the US penetration ratio is lower than the EU one since 2003, 
that is, a few years before the US measures strengthening the restrictions in US public procurement 
introduced in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. 
As the discussions on public procurement are very important in the TTIP negotiations, an 
additional database is used to check the trends suggested by Figure 3. This alternative database is the 
OECD Inter-Country Input-Output tables (hereafter OECD ICIO). These have been created for 
analyzing trade flows in value added. While similar to the data compiled by the WIOD project, the 
OECD ICIO data are different in several respects, and have pluses and minuses compared to the 
WIOD data. Among the minuses, the number of years covered is smaller, and data are reported on an 
annual basis only since 2008. Among the pluses, the data for 2010 and 2011 are based on more recent 
input-output tables released by the countries (as the OECD ICIO data were updated in June 2015). 
Figure 4, which is based on the OECD ICIO data, suggests the same catching up of the EU27 
compared to the US. However, the sharp decline after 2008 in the US penetration ratios is not 
confirmed. 
  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU27 Extra 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 2.8% 3.6% 3.7% 3.5% 3.4% 3.7% 4.2% 4.6% 4.5% 5.1% 4.4% 5.1% 5.3%
EU2 Extra 2.2% 2.2% 2.4% 2.3% 2.3% 2.8% 3.1% 2.9% 2.8% 3.0% 3.4% 3.8% 3.9% 4.3% 3.4% 3.8% 3.9%
Australia 5.1% 5.0% 5.4% 5.4% 5.9% 5.9% 5.8% 6.1% 5.5% 5.9% 6.0% 5.9% 6.2% 6.0% 5.4% 5.3% 5.8%
Brazil 2.1% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.7% 3.1% 3.5% 3.5% 3.3% 3.3% 3.1% 2.9% 3.0% 3.3% 2.9% 3.2% 3.7%
Canada 4.2% 4.3% 4.6% 4.9% 5.1% 5.1% 5.0% 4.9% 4.8% 4.7% 4.9% 4.6% 4.6% 4.8% 4.8% 4.2% 4.3%
China 3.8% 3.1% 3.3% 2.8% 3.0% 3.4% 3.3% 3.6% 4.5% 5.5% 5.6% 5.7% 5.2% 4.9% 3.9% 4.5% 4.7%
India 4.2% 4.4% 4.0% 4.4% 4.5% 4.4% 4.0% 3.5% 3.4% 4.6% 5.8% 6.3% 6.3% 6.4% 5.8% 6.7% 6.2%
Indonesia 7.9% 7.8% 7.9% 13.9% 9.3% 11.4% 11.6% 9.5% 8.2% 9.9% 10.6% 8.9% 8.8% 8.9% 6.1% 6.8% 8.0%
Japan 1.9% 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 2.0% 2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.8% 3.2% 3.8% 4.2% 5.2% 3.4% 4.0% 4.8%
Korea 7.5% 7.5% 8.4% 8.1% 7.7% 9.6% 9.3% 8.9% 9.1% 9.7% 9.9% 9.9% 10.2% 14.0% 11.6% 12.0% 14.4%
Mexico 4.8% 4.9% 5.2% 5.1% 4.9% 5.2% 4.9% 4.5% 5.0% 5.6% 5.8% 5.9% 6.3% 6.5% 5.7% 6.5% 7.4%
Russia 3.3% 3.5% 3.6% 4.6% 6.2% 5.3% 4.7% 4.2% 4.4% 3.7% 3.8% 3.3% 3.1% 3.1% 2.4% 2.6% 3.2%
Taiwan 9.9% 10.1% 10.8% 11.9% 10.7% 10.5% 10.2% 11.3% 11.2% 12.4% 11.9% 12.9% 13.5% 16.7% 13.7% 15.7% 17.3%
Turkey 5.4% 7.3% 6.5% 5.2% 4.4% 5.8% 7.2% 8.3% 8.1% 8.8% 9.5% 11.3% 10.9% 5.1% 4.6% 4.8% 6.0%
United States 2.7% 2.8% 2.9% 2.8% 3.0% 3.6% 3.5% 3.3% 3.6% 4.0% 4.4% 4.3% 4.4% 4.9% 3.7% 4.4% 4.8%
Rest of World 6.4% 6.8% 6.9% 6.9% 6.7% 7.1% 7.2% 7.9% 8.4% 8.8% 9.4% 9.1% 9.1% 8.7% 7.3% 7.3% 6.7%
World 4.2% 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 5.1% 5.2% 5.2% 5.5% 6.0% 6.4% 6.7% 6.8% 7.2% 6.0% 6.4% 6.7%
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Figure 3. EU27 and US penetration ratios, 1995-2011 (based on WIOD) 
 
Source: World Output-Input Database, November 2013. Authors’ calculations. 
Another mega-PTA being negotiated by the EU involves Japan. Here it is preferable to focus on the 
EU2 (France and Germany) subset for two reasons. First, it allows taking into account the size effect 
of public demand underlined in section 1—larger countries tend to have smaller penetration ratios. 
The size of the EU2 combined public demand is very close to the Japanese public demand (1.1 to 1.2 
times on the whole period), hence making the EU2 an appropriate set of EUMSs to compare to Japan.
5
 
Second, it focuses on two Member States that have expressed serious reservations on opening PTA 
negotiations with Japan, and/or have taken an aggressive stance on opening the public procurement 
markets of key trading partners (Canada, US). 
  
                                                     
5
 However, some caution is in order. The EU2 public demand is an aggregated figure of two economies which, 
individually, are significantly smaller than Japan (Germany and France are 0.6 and 0.5 times the Japanese economy). 
Hence, the EU2 penetration ratios are systematic over-estimates of what would have been the penetration ratios of a fully 
unified EU2 economy, since aggregating these two economies does not eliminate the fact that decisions have been taken 
in the context of these two notably smaller economies. 
Patrick Messerlin 
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Figure 4. EU27 and US penetration ratios, selected years (based on OECD ICIO) 
 
Source: OECD ICIO, June 2015. Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 5, which is based on WIOD data, shows that Japan’s penetration ratios have progressively 
caught up the EU2 ratios since 2003-2004. Since 2007 Japan is more open than the EU2, despite the 
intrinsic size-related bias of the EU2 data (see the note of caution in footnote 6). Figure 6, which uses 
OECD ICIO data, reinforces Figure 5: Japan’s penetration ratio is higher than the EU2’s as of 2005, 
and remains higher in subsequent years. 
Figure 5. EU2 and Japan penetration ratios, 1995-2011 (based on WIOD) 
 
Source: World Output-Input Database, November 2013. Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 6. EU2 and Japan penetration ratios, selected years (OECD ICIO data) 
 
Source: OECD ICIO, June 2015. Authors’ calculations. 
Finally, Table 3 reports data on the evolution of intra- and extra-EU penetration ratios for the EU27 
and for the EU2. Since 2003, the average annual growth of the intra-EU2 penetration ratio has slowed 
down. It became smaller than the extra-EU2 ratio after 2008. This evolution may simply reflect more 
sluggish growth in the EU Member States, but may also reflect an Internal Market in public 
procurement which does not function well, at least to the extent that it involves these two EUMS. 
Results using OECD ICIO data (Figure 8) highlight the increasing similarity between the extra- and 
intra-EU ratios for the EU2. 
Table 3. Intra-EU penetration ratios of public procurement markets (based on WIOD) 
 
Source: World Output-Input Database, November 2013. Authors’ calculations. 
  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU27 Intra 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 3.6% 3.6% 3.9% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 4.3% 4.3% 4.5% 4.6% 4.8% 4.5% 4.4% 4.7%
EU2 Intra 2.3% 2.5% 2.7% 2.9% 2.8% 3.0% 3.3% 3.6% 3.7% 3.7% 3.9% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 3.9% 3.9% 4.2%
Patrick Messerlin 
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Figure 7. Intra and extra EU2 penetration ratios, 1995-2011 (based on WIOD) 
 
Source: World Output-Input Database, November 2013. Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 8. Intra and extra EU2 penetration ratios, selected years (OECD ICIO) 
 
Source: OECD ICIO, June 2015. Authors’ calculations. 
3. Divergence between discourse and reality 
The data reported in Table 2 permit going beyond bilateral comparisons with the world’s largest 
trading nations. They show that the EU and US public procurement markets are increasingly less open 
than those of most East Asian economies. These observations raise the following question: how can 
one explain the huge divergence between discourse and reality during the last years? 
How open are public procurement markets? 
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A first answer is provided by the absence of reliable information in the WTO-GPA forum. All the 
signatories of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) have recognized that a huge 
effort should be made to collect much better data on the openness of public procurement markets, and 
to make their notifications much more comparable [Anderson 2012]. The current methodologies used 
for estimating the GPA-covered public procurements are so different among the signatories that it is 
impossible to reconcile them [Anderson et al. 2011, in particular footnotes 21 to 23]. 
These good intentions suggest exploring ways to improve on the current measures. The key 
question is whether it makes sense to continue to rely on the current indicators based on GPA 
commitments—such as the list of the public procurement markets (entities, sectors) covered. A 
parallel with trade in goods is useful for shedding some light on this issue. It comes to nobody’s mind 
to assess the openness of a country to trade in goods by focusing exclusively on the list of tariff 
concessions made by the country in question. Rather, assessments of countries’ openness routinely 
take into account the whole universe of goods (the Harmonized System) including the tariffs that a 
country may enforce without having necessarily negotiated them. This is in sharp contrast with the 
current way to assess openness in the GPA context which focuses only on the lists of products which 
have been subjected to negotiations for being liberalized. Not only is such a method not exhaustive, 
but it generates variable yardsticks, as these will reflect the wide differences in the types of goods and 
services procured and the heterogeneity of the public entities that are listed in national GPA 
commitments. It does not permit economically sound comparisons among countries. 
There is thus a need to use an approach in public procurement similar to that used for trade in 
goods. Such an approach requires a unique definition of the whole set of economic activities 
potentially subjected to the universe of “public procurement”—independently from the commitments 
made by GPA signatories. As noted previously, there are two reasons why national accounts data are 
the only statistics to offer such a basis. First, public demand is the best common basis for assessing the 
relative size of the public procurements markets among economies since it takes into account every 
euro or dollar spent by any public authority, whether central, local or a specific entity. Second, 
corresponding public imports benefit from the extensive efforts that have been pursued during the last 
fifty years by the National Accounts authorities in every country in the world for collecting 
comparable data. Last but not least, National Accounts allow having data over time, independently 
from GPA commitments related to specific negotiations. In short, the GPA forum should consider to 
adopt a methodology based on the one followed in section 2 to assess levels and trends in openness of 
procurement markets. 
4. Lessons for negotiations on public procurement markets 
Four lessons can be drawn from the foregoing measurement exercise. The first two center on 
improving the preparation of the future negotiations; the two others concern ways to improve the 
negotiating techniques per se. 
First, governments should refrain from claiming that their public procurement markets are more 
open than those of their trading partners without providing robust evidence. There are now enough 
data to quickly check such claims, making those that are not well-founded costly in terms of reputation 
for the governments that would adopt such a stance, hence ultimately weakening their negotiating 
leverage. 
Second, “penetration ratios” in the case of large economies can be misleading in both an 
international as well as a domestic context. The EU offers a useful illustration of this. As shown by 
Figures 1 and 2, penetration ratios among the 27 EUMS vary by a factor of almost 5. Such a situation 
is much less likely for trade in goods: once imported in a given “region” of a large economy, goods 
can circulate freely to the other “regions” of the economy. The fact that tradability is much more 
limited in public procurement contracts implies that an “average” openness indicator for public 
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procurement in a large economy may easily be a meaningless average of “open” and “closed” regions 
within that economy. As a result, there is a need to start working on data on public procurement 
openness at the sub-central or sub-federal level for large economies—e.g., the US, India, Canada, 
China, etc. It is worth stressing that such efforts are useful in the domestic context as well. As 
illustrated above in the EU case (the only large economy for which there are data at the “sub-central” 
level), an average openness indicator reduces the incentives to open the most closed EU Member 
States not only vis-à-vis the rest of the world, but also vis-à-vis the other EU Member States. 
The two other lessons to be drawn from our measurement exercise center on negotiating techniques 
per se. First, the evidence presented in this paper illustrates an intrinsic weakness of the notion of 
“reciprocity”. To make sense, such a notion requires two conditions: (i) the country stating such a 
claim should really be more open than its trading partner(s); and (ii) the threat associated with 
reciprocity—that is, closing the “more open” market if the trading partner does not open more its own 
markets without asking for concessions—should be credible. Checking whether this second condition 
is met is crucial.  
Table 4. Relative size of the public procurement markets, selected countries (based on WIOD) 
 
Source: World Output-Input Database, November 2013. Authors’ calculations. 
For illustrative purposes, Table 4 shows that such credibility is unlikely even for a large trading 
partner: the ratios of EU public demand to the public demand of its three main trading partners are low 
(US and Japan) or have recently become low (China). The implication is that threats could easily end 
up in costly retaliations for the firms of the threatening entity—or worse, could induce other large 
trading partners to adopt a “reciprocity” tactic. As a result, the threat of a large trading country is 
meaningful only in case of (much) smaller trading partners. But then, it remains to be seen whether 
this situation has positive net benefits when one takes into account the substantial political costs that 
are likely to arise (the large country being perceived by the whole trade community as “bullying” the 
smaller countries). 
The last lesson concerns a complex situation which is likely to emerge more and more often as time 
goes on. It is the case where goods and services are produced and delivered by state-owned entities 
ruled by the Government Procurement Agreement in one country while they are delivered in the other 
country by privately owned entities under private contract law. A good illustration of this case are the 
Japan-EU negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement in the rail sector. In both economies, passengers 
rail services (hereafter PRS) operators buy rail equipment. Almost all the PRS operators are publicly-
owned in the EU, whereas in Japan some 70 percent of PRS are delivered by three privately-owned 
and economically healthy operators (JR-East, JR-Central and JR-West). Such a situation is frequent in 
many infrastructure sectors. 
Using the Japan-EU rail illustration, what follows explores briefly the option to negotiate a specific 
chapter on the rail sector that would introduce “parallel” commitments for publicly-owned and private 
operators in a balanced and progressive way. The introduction (“chapeau”) of such a chapter could 
state that (i) the FTA’s ultimate goal is to improve the welfare of the European and Japanese train 
passengers, and that this goal requires a progressively improved market access in the rail supply 
markets of both partners; (ii) note that coping with prevailing legal differences (private/public 
operators) requires two sub-chapters, one addressing the issues raised by better access to markets 
dominated by private PRS operators (be in Japan or in the EU) and the other one addressing the issues 
raised by better access to markets dominated by publicly-owned PRS operators (again be in Japan or 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU27/USA 1.30 1.29 1.14 1.12 1.04 0.90 0.84 0.91 1.06 1.16 1.16 1.19 1.28 1.32 1.24 1.19 1.28
EU2/Japan 0.92 1.06 1.03 1.10 0.89 0.73 0.81 0.91 1.03 1.08 1.11 1.23 1.38 1.33 1.18 1.07 1.02
EU2/China 7.61 6.39 4.67 4.20 3.62 2.85 2.54 2.59 2.78 2.52 2.15 1.95 1.65 1.44 1.25 1.04 0.90
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in the EU); and (iii) spell out the conditions under which a PRS operator would be listed in one or the 
other of these two sub-chapters, and the criteria that need to be met for it to be shifted from one sub-
chapter to the other. 
The sub-chapter devoted to state-owned operators would state that they should be perfectly 
consistent with the provisions of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. The sub-chapter 
devoted to private operators would state that these operators should have equally transparent 
purchasing rules, and possibly clarify this statement in the negotiated text or under the form of 
voluntary codes of conduct to be followed by the private firms (indeed as done by the three private JR 
companies in the Japan-EU case). Finally, such provisions could be complemented by measures 
specifying a progressive liberalization of the covered operators when purchasing equipment. For 
instance, it could be agreed that the year Y will witness better market access for the purchases of (say 
rail) equipment by (possibly only a first group of) private operators and better market access for the 
public procurement of (say rail) equipment by (possibly only a first group of) publicly-owned 
operators, with both sets of operators having roughly of the same economic size. Such a progressive 
and balanced scheduling of improved market access would accommodate the differences in legal 
situations, while ensuring that benefits accrue to all the consumers in both signatories.  
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Annex 1 
The impact assessment working document (IAWD) is the analytical basis of the Directive proposal 
[European Commission 2012]. It consists in a cover text and 11 annexes. Its Annex 3 entitled 
“Problem analysis” is the key part of the IAWD in terms of market openness since it presents the 
Commission’s estimates of the level of openness of public procurement markets in the EU as a whole 
(there is no estimate by EU Member State) and in twelve major EU trading partners. 
Table A1 recapitulates the figures of Tables 3 and 7 of the IAWD Annex 3 which summarizes the 
main findings. 
 Column 1 presents the size (in billions of Euros) of the total public procurement markets above 
the thresholds as set by the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) signed at the end of the 
Uruguay Round (1995).
6
 
 Column 2 presents the IAWD Annex 3 estimates of the public procurement markets openness 
based on the legal international commitments taken by the EU and twelve countries, either under 
the 1995 WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) or under existing preferential trade 
agreements (as best illustrated by Mexico which is not a Party to the GPA). The openness ratios 
of these so-called de jure commitments are given by the share (in percent) of the value of the 
markets considered as open de jure in the total value of public procurement markets above the 
GPA thresholds. 
 Column 3 presents the IAWD Annex 3 estimates of the commitments taken by the EU with 
respect to its twelve partners when the “general notes or specific derogations” are taken into 
account Specific derogations are targeted restrictions imposed by the EU “because of the 
disparities in commitments” in 1995 GPA [Annex 3 page 8]. For instance, the US has not been 
granted access to EU public procurement markets in water, airports services and urban transport 
(among others) and Japan has not been granted access to EU public procurement markets in 
electricity and urban transport [General Notes and Derogations from Article III, Appendix I for 
the EC, Government Procurement Agreement 2003]. 
 Column 4 presents the IAWD Annex 3 estimates of the public procurement markets openness of 
the EU’s partners on a de facto basis. A market is considered as open de facto if “a country does 
not apply protectionist measures in the public procurement markets that are not open de jure” 
[IAWD Annex 3, methodological box 4]. The de facto openness ratios are measured by the share 
(in percent) of the value of the markets considered as open de facto in the total value of public 
procurement markets above the GPA thresholds. 
 For information sake, column 6 describes very briefly the current situation in terms of PTAs 
between the EU and the other countries listed. 
  
                                                     
6
 The IAWD presents the potential de jure commitments that the EU would take under the new GPA under negotiations in 
the WTO if these negotiations were successful. This information is not reported in Table 1 since the IAWD provides no 
equivalent estimates for the EU’s trading partners. 
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Table A1. The IAWD’s estimates of the openness of public procurement markets 
 
Source: IAWD Annex 3, Tables 3 and 7. PP: public procurement. [a] in billions of Euros. [b] in percent of total 
PP markets above the 1995 Government Procurement Agreement threshold. [c] taking into account the specific 
derogations imposed by the EU in order to achieve “balanced” concessions; [d] taking into account the absence 
of protectionist measures (Methodological Box 4); [e] an estimate of Euros 279 billion was reported in previous 
drafts and is still reported sometimes; [f] mostly because of Mexico’s PTAs with the US and the EU. 
Column 2 figures are those systematically reported by the proponents of the Directive for justifying 
the need for such a Directive. Indeed, these figures deliver a strong impression of asymmetry: the 
estimated openness of the EU public procurement markets (85 percent) is much larger than the 
openness of most of the EU trading partners (which range from 0 to 75 percent). 
However, such a comparison does not compare what is comparable. It systematically over-estimates 
the EU level of openness and systematically under-estimates the level of openness of the EU’s trading 
partners: 
 Column 2 systematically over-estimates EU openness because it does not take into account the 
“specific derogations” that the EU imposes on a bilateral basis because of the disparities in 
commitments. These specific derogations are an integral part of the 1995 GPA. As a result, they 
are the best definition of the “true” EU commitments. Column 3 takes into account these specific 
derogations, and shows a drastic reduction of the level of openness of the EU in all the cases but 
Korea. For instance, the EU degree of openness drops from 85 percent (column 2) to 46 percent 
(column 3) in the case of the US and to 70 percent (column 3) in the case of Japan. 
 Column 2 systematically under-estimates the openness of the EU trading partners because it 
does not take into account the fact that countries do not apply de facto protectionist measures in 
some public procurement markets. Column 4 shows that taking into account these open market 
practices increase drastically the true level of openness of all EU partners which then ranges 
from 24 to 92 percent. 
 In short, two important lessons can be drawn from Table A1: 
Size of de jure
PP markets commit- Preferential trade agreements (PTA)
covered ments (%) EU EU's between the EU's trading partners
[a] [b] % [d] partners and the EU
1 2 3 4 5
Parties to the 1995 Government Procurement Agreement
EU 370 85 -- --
USA [e] 559 32 46 47 ongoing negotiations
Japan 96 28 70 72 ongoing negotiations
Canada 59 16 10 40 PTA agreement signed
Korea 25 65 82 80 PTA implemented
Israel 2 75 na 75 PTA implemented
Other countries
Mexico [f] 20 75 na 92 PTA implemented
China 83 0 -- 24 no PTA under consideration
Russia 18 0 -- 56 no PTA under consideration
India 19 0 -- 70 ongoing negotiations
Brazil 42 0 -- 38 ongoing negotiations with Mercosur
Turkey 24 0 -- 25 Customs Union does not cover public procurement
Australia 20 0 -- 63 PTA negotiations to be opened
Total non EU 967 25 18 na
de facto [c]
commitments (%)
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 The “true” EU level of openness (including specific derogations) and the “true” level of 
commitments of EU GPA partners (taking into account systematic non-protectionist practices) 
are generally very similar. 
 The level of openness of non-GPA countries is within the range of the “true” EU level of 
openness (10 to 82 percent). 
Comparing what is comparable leads to the conclusion that the IAWD on which the Directive proposal 
relies fails to support the EU claim to have public procurement markets that are more open than those 
of its partners. 
To conclude, it is useful to put into perspective the “asymmetry” in the level of openness argued by 
the proponents of the Directive. Such an asymmetry would imply that the European negotiators (from 
the Commission and the Member States) would have negotiated “badly” during the Uruguay Round. 
This is because, during the Uruguay Round, the GPA was not part of the global trade-off among all 
issues on the table (industrial tariff cuts, agricultural “tariffication”, opening services markets, etc.). 
Rather, it was a stand-alone negotiation that involved only a limited number of “willing” countries, not 
all GATT contracting parties (i.e., it was a “plurilateral’ agreement). The logic of stand-alone trade 
negotiations imposes that, on the sole issue at stake (in this case, the opening of public procurement 
markets), every country balances the market access concessions it grants to its partners almost exactly 
with the market concessions it gets from its partners. The available evidence on the GPA negotiations 
during the Uruguay Round does not support the hypothesis of a failure of the EU negotiators. The 
experts who analyzed the 1995 GPA stressed the almost perfect balance of the negotiations between 
the two largest trading partners in terms of value of the markets opened, with US$ 103.2 billion 
opened by the US side and US$ 103.3 billion opened by the EU [Schott and Buurman 1994]. Indeed, 
for reaching such a balance, the US negotiators had to bring at the table of negotiations 39 US States 
(including the five largest) and 7 US municipalities (among the 24 largest US towns) on the top of the 
federal public procurement markets.
7
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 These figures are those related to US commitments with respect to the EU. 
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Annex 2 
As in the Ramboll study, our analysis of import penetration ratios is based on Input-Output data. Our 
main results rely on the World Input-Output Database (Timmer et al, 2015). This set of input-output 
tables offers two advantages: 
 First, it covers all EU economies, as well as 13 other major countries, over the period 1995-
2009. This gives better geographic and time coverage. 
 In addition, the dataset provides a global (world) matrix of inter-country and inter-industry 
transactions. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish between extra-EU and intra-EU imports 
when it comes to public demand. 
The methodology used to construct the WIOD tables is explained in Timmer et al. (2012). The 
benchmark being national accounts, the data are comparable to the ones analysed in the Ramboll 
study. But figures are not exactly the same because of differences in the way data are harmonised and 
balanced in the WIOD and OECD tables used in the Ramboll study. 
As a robustness check, the same calculations are done using the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output 
matrices that are the underlying data of the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (OECD ICIO) 
database. These tables are also not fully comparable with the ones used in the Ramboll report, despite 
being also issued by the OECD. The reason is that they correspond to more recent work (June 2015 
update) and more recently collected input-output information (using the 2010 benchmark input-output 
tables released by countries in 2013-2014). 
With both the WIOD and OECD ICIO data, public demand is calculated as the sum of: 
 Final consumption expenditure by governments 
 Intermediate consumption by industries in public sectors 
The public sectors are defined as: ‘electricity, gas and water supply’ (100%), ‘post and 
telecommunications’ (50%), ‘public administrations and defence; compulsory social security’ (100%), 
‘education’ (100%) and ‘health and social work’ (100%). There are slight differences between the 
WIOD and OECD ICIO industry classification of industries, but not for these sectors.  
The same classification of public procurement by industry is used as in the Ramboll study (table 2, p. 
18), except that ‘sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar services’ is excluded as there are 
no specific data for these activities in the WIOD and OECD ICIO data (the sector is aggregated with 
‘other community, social and personal services’). As this industry represents a small share of public 
demand (in terms of imports of intermediate products), our results can only be marginally affected by 
its omission.  
Table A2 below is similar to Tables 2, 3 and 4 in the main text but gives the detailed results of our 
calculations with the OECD ICIO database (using the June 2015 update). 
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Table A2. Public procurement penetration ratios, selected countries (OECD ICIO data) 
 
 
 
 
  
1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011
A. Penetration ratios (ratios 3 of Table 1)
EU27 Extra 2.3% 3.6% 3.6% 4.1% 3.6% 4.1% 4.4%
EU2 Extra 1.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.6% 3.0% 3.3%
Australia 4.8% 5.8% 5.3% 5.8% 4.9% 5.0% 5.2%
Brazil 1.4% 2.1% 2.3% 2.1% 2.1% 2.3% 2.4%
Canada 6.1% 5.3% 4.9% 3.8% 4.0% 4.0% 3.8%
China 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
India 3.5% 3.9% 4.2% 6.7% 4.8% 5.2% 6.5%
Indonesia 5.5% 10.3% 9.9% 7.8% 5.6% 6.2% 7.1%
Japan 2.1% 2.6% 3.9% 5.4% 3.5% 3.7% 5.2%
Korea 6.1% 9.2% 10.3% 13.2% 11.6% 12.1% 14.0%
Mexico 3.3% 3.7% 3.0% 4.0% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8%
Russia 4.7% 6.7% 4.9% 4.8% 4.5% 4.6% 4.9%
Taiwan 8.7% 7.7% 10.7% 15.3% 12.7% 14.0% 16.0%
Turkey 8.3% 6.6% 4.7% 5.2% 4.4% 4.7% 4.4%
United States 2.9% 3.6% 4.1% 4.6% 3.6% 4.3% 4.4%
Rest of World 5.7% 5.5% 6.1% 6.2% 5.8% 5.9% 6.0%
World 4.0% 4.6% 5.2% 5.8% 4.9% 5.3% 5.6%
B. Relative size of the public procurement markets (ratios of EU public demand to trading partner's public demand)
EU27/USA 1.32 0.90 1.14 1.31 1.24 1.17 1.23
EU2/Japan 0.93 0.74 1.08 1.31 1.19 1.08 1.04
EU2/China 8.01 2.50 2.00 1.46 1.29 1.10 0.97
C. Intra-EU ratios (ratios 4 of Table 1)
EU27 Intra 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 3.7% 3.5% 3.8% 3.9%
EU2 Intra 2.1% 2.6% 2.9% 3.0% 2.9% 3.1% 3.3%
Source : OECD ICIO, June 2015. Authors' calculations.
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